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Tweeting the Police: Balancing Free Speech and 
Decency on Government-Sponsored Social Media 
Pages 
Alysha L. Bohanon* 
Imagine that you are the police chief for a small suburban 
city in the Midwest. The department is considering launching 
an official Facebook page, where members of the community 
can receive updates on police business and new city ordinances, 
read about crime alerts or big cases solved, and interact with 
the department through public comments or private messages. 
You and your officers believe the page could improve com-
munity relations by connecting with citizens and showcasing 
the beneficial work the department does, especially during a 
time of widespread outrage at police departments.1 But you are 
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School. I would 
like to thank Professor Heidi Kitrosser for her expertise and thoughtful com-
ments throughout this process. Thanks also to Mary Heath, Kristin McGaver, 
Molly Malloy, Matt Hart, and Cassandra Fenton, as well as the editors and 
staff members of Minnesota Law Review for their work on this Note and all of 
Volume 101. Most importantly, thanks to my family and friends, and especial-
ly to my parents for their unwavering support in law review, law school, and 
everything else. Copyright © 2016 by Alysha L. Bohanon. 
 1. Fatal police shootings of unarmed civilians—most frequently, young 
black men—have sparked widespread riots, the Black Lives Matter social jus-
tice movement, and ongoing national debate over police use of deadly force. As 
of this writing, 776 people have been shot and killed by police in the United 
States in 2016. See Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2016 (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). In 
2015, police fatally shot nearly 1000 civilians. See 991 People Shot Dead by Po-
lice in 2015, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/ 
police-shootings (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). One in ten of these civilians were 
unarmed. See id. Although black men make up only six percent of the U.S. 
population, they accounted for forty percent of the unarmed men fatally shot 
by police in 2015. See id.; Kimberly Kindy, Marc Fisher, Julie Tate, & Jennifer 
Jenkins, A Year of Reckoning: Police Fatally Shoot Nearly 1,000, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/wp/2015/12/ 
26/2015/12/26/a-year-of-reckoning-police-fatally-shoot-nearly-1000; see also 
Paul D. Shinkman, Outrage at Police Could Bring Return of Dark Ages of 
Crime, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/ 
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concerned about maintaining editorial control of your page, es-
pecially after a glance at the Minneapolis Police Department’s 
Facebook page reveals numerous hostile, racist, spammy,2 and 
off-topic comments. A crime update about a robbery, posted by 
the Minneapolis Police Department, quickly devolved in the 
comments section to name-calling and a heated argument 
about guns, race, and the Black Lives Matter movement: “You 
can’t arrest them there [sic] Black!! Isn’t that right ‘black lives 
matter’”;3 “Shocker, black suspect. Lets [sic] hope they get 
themselves shot”;4 “I can’t help it that you’re too much of a 
libtard to understand any intention that doesn’t meet your fac-
tual vortex libtard agenda. DERP.”5 Another post from a citizen 
discussing a theft from her mailbox was quickly taken off-topic 
by a commenter: “We are fucking shit up today! LET’S START 
A RIOT! FUCK THE POLICE! #Justice4Jamar.”6 
You worry excessively hateful, racist, or potentially incit-
ing comments like these will distract from the message you 
want to send and prevent productive discourse. You wonder: 
How much control will you have to moderate posts and delete 
those you find inappropriate without violating the commenters’ 
First Amendment right to free expression? 
 
news/articles/2014/12/23/outrage-at-police-could-return-cities-to-dark-ages-of 
-crime (“‘It’s us versus them.’ That’s been a repeated refrain from protesters, 
police officers, experts in law enforcement behavior and some top leaders, in 
the wake of several incidents of unarmed people dying at the hands of police, 
followed by an armed man killing two NYPD officers. The tone of frustration 
from both sides reflects a growing sense of nationwide disenfranchisement be-
tween police departments and the communities they are tasked to protect.”). 
 2. This Note will use “spammy” to describe social media posts and com-
ments that constitute Internet spam. Spam includes, among other things, un-
wanted advertising, phishing, malicious links, or fraudulent reviews. 
 3. Mitchell Paul, Comment to Post by the Minneapolis Police Depart-
ment, FACEBOOK (Dec. 11, 2015, 9:46 AM), https://www.facebook.com/ 
MinneapolisPoliceDepartment. For an explanation of the fatal police shooting 
in Minneapolis that spurred these comments, see Dana Ford, Eliott C. 
McLaughlin, & Ray Sanchez, Jamar Clark Death: Protesters Rally After No 
Charges Filed Against Police, CNN (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/ 
03/30/us/minneapolis-jamar-clark-police-shooting-no-charges/index.html. 
 4. Brandon Swart, Comment to Post by the Minneapolis Police Depart-
ment, FACEBOOK (Dec. 11, 2015, 9:46 AM), https://www.facebook.com/ 
MinneapolisPoliceDepartment. 
 5. Monica Christine, Comment to Post by the Minneapolis Police De-
partment, FACEBOOK (Dec. 11, 2015, 9:46 AM), https://www.facebook.com/ 
MinneapolisPoliceDepartment. 
 6. Cliff McCoy, Comment to Review by Jeannette Chapman, Minneapolis 
Police Department, FACEBOOK (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/ 
MinneapolisPoliceDepartment. 
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The answer: good question. Despite the prevalence of gov-
ernment social media pages, current First Amendment juris-
prudence provides no clear rule. 
It is increasingly common for public entities to enter the 
social media realm. Just as the Internet and new platforms of 
communication have revolutionized the way the public inter-
acts with one another, they have similarly transformed how the 
government communicates with its constituents, and vice ver-
sa. Government entities ranging from the White House,7 
NASA,8 and the Pentagon9 all the way down to the smallest 
branches of local government increasingly rely on their social 
media pages to inform and interact with the public in various 
ways, including policy blogs, behind-the-scenes photos and vid-
eos, emergency notifications, and severe weather alerts.10 These 
posts can attract a wide range of comments from constituents, 
which can lead to clashes between government and private ex-
pression interests.11 
When posts are truly vulgar and offensive, are the user’s 
speech interests even worth protecting? From a constitutional 
standpoint, if the posts fall within the purview of the First 
Amendment, then they must be protected from government 
censorship.12 Freedom of expression is a universal human right, 
and this protection does not wither when speech is tasteless, 
trivial, or objectionable.13 This protection for offensive speech is 
 
 7. The White House, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/WhiteHouse 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2016). 
 8. NASA, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/NASA (last visited Oct. 
23, 2016). 
 9. Pentagon Force Protection Agency, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook 
.com/PentagonForceProtectionAgency (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). 
 10. See, e.g., City of Minneapolis Government, FACEBOOK, https://www 
.facebook.com/cityofminneapolis (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (using social media 
page to update followers about, among other things, community programming, 
snow emergencies, road closures, and the adoptable “Pet of the Week”). 
 11. See Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check: Does the First Amendment 
Protect Violent Ranting on Facebook?, CONST. DAILY (June 2, 2015), http://blog 
.constitutioncenter.org/2015/06/constitution-check-does-the-first-amendment 
-protect-violent-ranting-on-facebook (“The growth of the digital world has gen-
erated a lengthening list of questions about how far free expression should be 
allowed to remain free in the ubiquitous forums of the Internet.”). 
 12. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 13. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 
19 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
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especially strong in the United States, where “[i]f there is a 
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that 
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disa-
greeable.”14 
The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether the 
First Amendment protects private social media users when 
they comment on a government-sponsored page. Courts consid-
ering the First Amendment implications of social media in oth-
er contexts have recognized that social media posts from pri-
vate individuals can constitute protected speech.15 But when a 
user comments on a government-sponsored page, the issue is 
more complex. In this case, the level of protection the First 
Amendment provides to the speech depends on the extent to 
which the social media page is categorized as a public forum, 
and whether the private speech posted on this forum prevents 
the government from speaking for itself.16 Courts use the public 
forum and government speech doctrines to solve comparable is-
 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and re-
gardless of frontiers.”). Defining what is offensive is also inherently subjective: 
What is “controversial” varies according to circumstances, and just 
because it is controversial does not make it “bad”—sometimes a con-
troversial statement is precisely what’s needed to push conversations 
in productive directions. . . . 
[Controversial speech] must nevertheless be vigorously defended, 
not just because of the moral imperative to protect free speech—a 
fundamental human right—but also because to do otherwise would 
open the doors for further restrictions, not just on “bad” speech but on 
“good” speech as well. 
Asma Uddin, Even Controversial Views Should Be Protected by Freedom of 
Speech, HUFFINGTON POST (July 6, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
asma-uddin/free-speech-protection-fo_b_563729.html. 
 14. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also Terminiello v. 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“[A] function of free speech under our system of 
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose 
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions 
as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and chal-
lenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound un-
settling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of 
speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against censorship or 
punishment . . . . There is no room under our Constitution for a more restric-
tive view.” (citations omitted)). 
 15. See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that “liking” a political candidate’s Facebook page constitutes political speech 
protected under the First Amendment) (“On the most basic level, clicking on 
the ‘like’ button literally causes to be published the statement that the User 
‘likes’ something, which is itself a substantive statement.”). 
 16. See infra Part I.A. 
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sues involving both private and governmental parties with of-
fline expression, but these doctrines are notoriously difficult to 
apply.17 
This Note explores the extent to which government entities 
can control and censor private speech posted on government-
sponsored social media websites, such as comments on a city 
police department’s Facebook page or a federal agency’s Twitter 
feed. Part I sets forth the foundations of the public forum and 
government speech doctrines, and discusses the government-
versus-private speech dichotomy these doctrines create in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Part II analyzes government-
sponsored social media as speech under both of the doctrines, 
exploring the significant limitations in categorizing speech in 
an online government forum as either purely private or purely 
government speech. Part III presents a solution that, although 
especially attuned to speech on social media pages, is designed 
to fit both traditional18 and online speech. Although other com-
menters have called for a middle category for contested 
speech,19 this Note proposes that before reaching this middle 
category, courts should first determine whether the private and 
government speech within the forum are sufficiently distinct to 
receive separate First Amendment protections. This framework 
affords the strongest protection to private speech while respect-
ing the government’s interest in speaking for itself. 
I.  EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF EXISTING FIRST 
AMENDMENT DOCTRINES: PUBLIC FORUM, 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH, AND RECENT FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE   
Although government-sponsored social media pages are a 
relatively recent development, the difficulty in distinguishing 
and adequately protecting expression with conflicting speech 
interests is a much older dilemma. This Part first describes the 
existing framework for categorizing speech in a government 
 
 17. See infra Part I. 
 18. This Note will use the term “traditional speech” to mean offline speech 
by private parties or the government that courts have analyzed under First 
Amendment doctrine, such as the spoken and written word, print and elec-
tronic media, and creative works. 
 19. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is 
Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008) (proposing a 
separate middle category for “mixed speech” to receive intermediate scrutiny). 
This Note will use the phrase “contested speech” to refer to speech claimed by 
both the government and private speakers. 
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setting and determining the level of First Amendment protec-
tion to afford it, using the public forum doctrine and the gov-
ernment speech doctrine. It then explains how the Supreme 
Court has applied these doctrines in recent First Amendment 
cases where both government and private parties lay expres-
sive claim to the same speech. 
A. DOCTRINES RECOGNIZING PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT 
SPEECH INTERESTS 
When speech occurs in a government setting, such as on 
public property or through a government sponsorship or subsi-
dy, the degree of First Amendment protection provided to the 
speech depends on whether the speaker is private or govern-
mental.20 The Supreme Court recognizes that some government 
property or largesse effectively constitute forums in which pri-
vate individuals may speak.21 When the Court concludes that a 
private person has spoken on government property or with gov-
ernment funds, the Court asks what kind of a forum that prop-
erty or largesse comprised in order to determine the level of 
First Amendment protection the speech should receive.22 This 
principle is known as the public forum doctrine: the more open 
and accessible the property is to the public, the fewer limita-
tions the government may place on private expression within 
the forum.23 Meanwhile, if the government is characterized as 
speaking—even if the literal speaker is a private person—the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment does not apply to 
protect any private speech interests.24 This principle is known 
 
 20. See Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech 
and Government Speech Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2412 (2004) [here-
inafter Compelled Speech]. Speech from an entity other than the government 
is considered private. Id. When private entities speak from private property 
(as opposed to in a government setting), they receive the strictest form of First 
Amendment protection. 
 21. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 22. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 23. See generally Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975 
(2011) (detailing the public forum doctrine and the level of First Amendment 
protection provided to each category). 
 24. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009) 
(“The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it 
does not regulate government speech. A government entity has the right to 
‘speak for itself.’ . . . Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government could 
function if it lacked this freedom.” (citations omitted)); Johanns v. Livestock 
Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (stating that the government’s own 
speech is “exempt from First Amendment scrutiny”). 
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as the government speech doctrine.25 This Section will explain 
the public forum and government speech doctrines in greater 
depth. 
1. The Public Forum Doctrine 
There is widespread confusion regarding how many catego-
ries of forums actually exist within the public forum doctrine. 
Courts and academics vary between finding two and four cate-
gories, and the names of the middle levels are not consistent.26 
This Note will describe all four potential categories: traditional 
public forums, designated public forums, limited public forums, 
and nonpublic forums. 
a. Traditional Public Forums 
The first category is the traditional public forum, or the 
“quintessential” town square.27 This includes a public street, 
park, or sidewalk, but is limited to physical property owned by 
the government that has “by long tradition or by government 
fiat” been “devoted to assembly and debate.”28 Because of the 
extensive history of freedom of speech and public assembly in 
these forums, the government’s ability to limit such activity is 
sharply circumscribed.29 Any content-based exclusion imposed 
by the government receives strict scrutiny: it must be “neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest,” and it must be nar-
rowly drawn to meet that purpose.30 Thus, a restriction based 
on the content of the expression carries a very heavy burden. 
 
 25. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 26. Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 647, 653–54 (2010) (“It is a bad sign if the doctrine is so 
confused that reasonable observers cannot even agree on how many categories 
of forum exist.”). 
 27. John D. Inazu, The First Amendment’s Public Forum, 56 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2015) (“The quintessential city park . . . reflects our ‘pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ The city government owns and 
manages the land and the physical structures built upon it. But within this 
space, anyone can say almost anything. Skaters, vagabonds, hipsters, Klans-
men, lesbians, Christians, and cowboys—the city park accommodates them all. 
The city park thus symbolizes a core feature of a democratic polity: the free-
dom of all citizens to express their views in public spaces free from the con-
straints of government-imposed orthodoxy.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 28. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983); see also Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1981–83. 
 29. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 30. Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). 
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The state may, however, enforce reasonable, content-neutral 
regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression, if 
such regulations are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest and leave open ample alternative means of 
expression.31 Traditional public forums receive the strictest pro-
tections for speech and assembly, but they are limited to histor-
ically open public spaces—seemingly off-limits to any modern 
development, including social media pages.32 
b. Designated (Open) Public Forums 
Even if a forum is not historically open (as the traditional 
public forum category requires), governments may create, or 
designate, a public forum as a place for expressive activity.33 
Examples of designated public forums include municipal thea-
ters and meeting rooms at state universities.34 Creating a des-
ignated public forum requires a clear indication of the govern-
ment’s intent to open a nontraditional forum to the public: 
“[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or 
by permitting limited discourse . . . .”35 To find intent, courts 
may look to the “policy and practice of the government,” wheth-
er the property was “designed for and dedicated to expressive 
activities,” or whether the property possesses “the characteris-
tics of a traditional public forum.”36 
A designated public forum is open to the general public and 
operates as a traditional public forum, with very similar First 
Amendment protections: “[r]easonable time, place, and manner 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003) 
(“The doctrines surrounding traditional public forums may not be extended to 
situations where such history is lacking.”); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) (holding that airport terminals are 
not traditional public forums because “given the lateness with which the mod-
ern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for the descrip-
tion of having ‘immemorially . . . time out of mind’ been held in the public 
trust and used for purposes of expressive activity. . . . Thus, the tradition of 
airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically been 
made available for speech activity” (citation omitted)); see also Lidsky, supra 
note 23, at 1983. 
 33. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 34. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989) (public stage 
facility); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264 (1981) (public university facili-
ty); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547 (1975) (mu-
nicipal theater). 
 35. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985). 
 36. Id. at 802–03. 
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regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition 
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state inter-
est.”37 The key constitutional difference between designated 
public forums and traditional public forums comes not in the 
regulations, but in the operation of the forum itself: “[a]lthough 
a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character 
of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same 
standards as apply in a traditional public forum.”38 In other 
words, the government cannot make content-based restrictions 
on speech without meeting strict scrutiny as long as the desig-
nated forum is open, but it may completely close the forum if it 
wishes. 
c. Limited Public Forums 
A limited public forum is also designated as public by the 
government, but only for a limited purpose.39 This may include 
use by only certain groups, or for the discussion of only certain 
subjects.40 Thus, the government may impose some content-
based restrictions in order to define and enforce the limits of 
speech allowed in the limited public forum, so long as these 
limits are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.41 However, “[t]he 
 
 37. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see also Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1983 n.40. 
 38. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; accord Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see also 
Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1984 n.46. 
 39. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1984. The limited public forum, now a mas-
sive element of the doctrine (and a source of great frustration), finds its roots 
in a scant footnote from the Supreme Court’s decision in Perry. Id. at 1983–84. 
The opinion states, “The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclu-
sions from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not required to 
create the forum in the first place.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46. This sentence 
was followed by a footnote: “A public forum may be created for a limited pur-
pose such as use by certain groups, or for the discussion of certain subjects.” 
Id. at 46 n.7 (citation omitted). The ambiguity of the Perry decision’s seventh 
footnote is emblematic of the public forum doctrine itself: “[i]t is unclear 
whether there is a single middle forum category, several subcategories, or 
whether a forum can be designated one way for one class of speakers and an-
other way for others.” Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1984 n.48 (quoting Note, Strict 
Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2140, 2142 (2009)); see also 
Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 975 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the 
phrase limited public forum “has been used as a synonym for the term ‘desig-
nated public forum’ and also for the phrase ‘nonpublic forum.’” (citing Ridley v. 
Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 76 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004))). 
 40. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7. 
 41. See Christian Legal Soc’y of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 
661, 679 (2010); Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1988–89. 
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State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not ‘rea-
sonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.’”42 
The line between designated open forums and limited pub-
lic forums is notably blurry.43 The distinction depends on the 
government’s intent in creating the forum: Did the state intend 
to create a “designated” open public forum that operates as a 
traditional public forum, or did it intend to establish a desig-
nated but “limited” public forum in which the government re-
tains more control over expressive activity?44 A frequent cri-
tique of the limited public forum is that it is heavily deferential 
to the government imposing the restriction—for all practical 
purposes, it is difficult to distinguish a discriminatory content-
based restriction from a viewpoint-neutral shaping of the fo-
rum’s subject matter parameters, especially when the constitu-
tional standard is reasonableness.45 
d. Nonpublic Forums 
The final forum category is the nonpublic forum. This kind 
of government property includes military bases, airport termi-
nals, and a public school’s internal mail system.46 Here, the 
government’s rights are similar to those of a private property 
owner, and it retains significant control over expressive activi-
ties in the forum.47 As in a public forum, the government can 
 
 42. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 
(1995) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806). 
 43. See, e.g., Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited Public Fo-
rum, 33 NOVA L. REV. 299, 300 (2009) (“Substantial confusion exists regarding 
what distinction, if any, exists between a ‘designated public forum’ and a ‘lim-
ited public forum.’”). 
 44. See Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Government Sponsored Social Media and Pub-
lic Forum Doctrine Under the First Amendment: Perils and Pitfalls, 19 PUB. 
LAW, Summer 2011, at 2, 4 (2011). 
 45. See Caplan, supra note 26, at 653 (“The ability of the government to 
select its own constitutional standard is another chief criticism lodged against 
the public forum doctrine. Why should the government be able to will away a 
speech-protective constitutional rule simply by intending that it not apply?” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 46. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 674 
(1992) (airport terminals); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 
460 U.S. 37, 39 (1983) (public school internal mail system); Greer v. Spock, 
424 U.S. 828, 830 (1976) (military base). 
 47. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (“[The] First Amendment does not guarantee 
access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the govern-
ment.” (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 
U.S. 114, 129 (1981))). 
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make reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.48 In 
nonpublic forums, the government may also exclude a speaker 
as long as the exclusion is “reasonable and not an effort to sup-
press expression merely because public officials oppose the 
speaker’s view”49—a much looser standard than the strict scru-
tiny used for a traditional or designated open public forum.50 In 
practice, however, there is very little difference between a non-
public and a limited public forum.51 Both require viewpoint 
neutrality, and state-imposed exclusions are judged according 
to a reasonableness standard.52 Some commentators suggest 
the difference between the two categories may stem from se-
mantics: perhaps a judge will apply the reasonableness inquiry 
with greater force to a limited public forum, yet approach the 
same inquiry in a nonpublic forum with deference to the gov-
ernment.53 
The doctrine used to assess the First Amendment protec-
tions afforded to private speech in a public forum is thus diffi-
cult to apply, as the lines distinguishing the forums—however 
many there are—are blurry.54 This application is increasingly 
complicated when government speech is involved. 
2. The Government Speech Doctrine 
The other category of speech, which is considered wholly 
apart from private speech (and the public forum doctrine), is 
speech made by the government. The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that the government has a substantial interest in pro-
moting its own programs.55 This recognition resulted in the 
government speech doctrine, a fairly recent legal development 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 45. 
 51. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1990 (“The line between the designated 
‘limited’ public forum and the nonpublic forum is maddeningly slippery, and 
some would even say non-existent, notwithstanding their linguistically op-
posed labels.”). 
 52. See id. at 1991; supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 53. See, e.g., id. at 1991–92, 1991 n.109 (suggesting the reasonableness 
inquiry is more likely to be applied with “bite” to a limited public forum than 
to a nonpublic forum). 
 54. See Lidsky, supra note 44, at 3 (noting the public forum doctrine was 
“‘virtually impermeable to common sense’ even before the internet came along” 
(quoting ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 199 (1995))). 
 55. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“[W]hen the Govern-
ment appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define 
the limits of that program.”). 
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that gives the government wide leeway to convey its own mes-
sages.56 In some circumstances, this leeway includes accepting 
speech from some private entities while excluding others with 
conflicting views.57 The recourse for such exclusion lies not in 
the First Amendment, but in the political process: the Supreme 
Court has reasoned that the government is ultimately account-
able to voters for its speech, and voters can elect new officials if 
they object to the government’s advocacy.58 
The government speech doctrine is used as a defense 
against speech restrictions, even those based on viewpoint, on 
the basis that the government may choose exactly what it 
wishes to say, including when it commissions private individu-
als to speak on its behalf.59 In its current form, this relatively 
new doctrine creates a strict dichotomy between contested 
speech being governmental or private: either the public forum 
doctrine (if speech is private) or the government speech doc-
trine (if speech is characterized as the government’s) can apply, 
but not both.60 It is hardly surprising that the government’s in-
 
 56. Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 904 (2010) (stating that the government speech doctrine 
“insulates the government’s own speech from First Amendment challenges by 
plaintiffs who seek to alter or join that expression”). 
 57. See Compelled Speech, supra note 20, at 2415. 
 58. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 563 (2005) 
(“[Government messages] are subject to political safeguards more than ade-
quate to set them apart from private messages.”); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Ve-
lazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541–42 (2001) (“The latitude which may exist for re-
strictions on speech where the government’s own message is being delivered 
flows in part from our observation that, ‘[w]hen the government speaks, for 
instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the 
end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If 
the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different 
or contrary position.’” (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000))); see also Lidsky, supra note 44, at 5. 
For a criticism of this method of recourse, see Norton & Citron, supra note 56, 
at 909–10 (arguing that political accountability mechanisms provide no mean-
ingful safeguard when the government is not required to identify itself as the 
speaker). 
 59. Or, in some cases, when plaintiffs claim their speech was compelled by 
the government. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562 (involving beef producers claim-
ing a compelled-subsidy program targeted at the beef industry violated their 
First Amendment rights). See generally Compelled Speech, supra note 20 (dis-
cussing the relationship between government speech and compelled speech 
doctrines). 
 60. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (stat-
ing that the case centers on whether the government was engaging in its own 
expressive conduct or providing a forum for private speech); see also Johanns, 
544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The government-speech doctrine is 
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terest in speaking for itself is often in tension with its obliga-
tion to respect free speech when individuals convey their own 
messages on government property or through government sub-
sidies. 
a. The Creation of the Government Speech Doctrine: The Rust 
Framework 
Although the Supreme Court never mentioned the term 
“government speech” in its opinion in Rust v. Sullivan,61 the 
case is widely considered the fountainhead of government 
speech jurisprudence.62 Rust involved federal regulations bar-
ring providers at family planning clinics that received federal 
funds under Title X of the Public Service Health Act from en-
gaging in abortion counseling, referral, advocacy, or other abor-
tion-related expression.63 Even if a pregnant woman specifically 
requested it, a Title X doctor could not refer her to an abortion 
provider.64 Suing on behalf of themselves and their patients, Ti-
tle X grantees and doctors contended the regulations violated 
the First Amendment by imposing conditions on the funds that 
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint.65 The law, the plaintiffs 
argued, impermissibly discriminated against all expression re-
lated to abortion, even neutral and accurate information, while 
compelling providers to communicate with pregnant women in 
a manner that promoted carrying the pregnancy to term.66 In a 
five-to-four decision, the majority held that the government 
was entitled to fund a program that advanced certain goals (to 
the exclusion of others) without violating the First Amend-
ment.67 
 
relatively new, and correspondingly imprecise.”). 
 61. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 62. See, e.g., Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (identifying Rust as a government 
speech case); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
833 (1995) (“[In Rust, we] recognized that when the government appropriates 
public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what 
it wishes.”); Norton & Citron, supra note 56 (“The Supreme Court identifies 
Rust v. Sullivan as the beginning of its government speech jurisprudence.”). 
 63. Rust, 500 U.S. at 179–80. 
 64. Id. at 180. Doctors were directed to respond to such a request by in-
forming the patient, “the [Title X] project does not consider abortion an appro-
priate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for 
abortion.” Id. 
 65. Id. at 192. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 194 (“When Congress established a National Endowment for 
Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was 
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In a spirited dissent, Justice Blackmun characterized the 
regulations as impermissibly content-based, viewpoint-based, 
and intended to suppress “dangerous ideas” by manipulating 
the most private of conversations: “the very words spoken to a 
woman by her physician.”68 
Although the Court in Rust did not expressly classify the 
regulations as government speech, the decision supports the 
notion that the government is entitled to establish limits for its 
own programs, even at the expense of otherwise-private speech, 
without violating the First Amendment.69 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions characterized the 
regulations at issue in Rust as government speech and identi-
fied the opinion as creating the “Rust framework.”70 Under the 
Rust framework, the only question to be determined is one of 
fact: Who is speaking?71 If the speech is private speech taking 
place in a public forum, it is subject to analysis under the pub-
lic forum doctrine. This is true regardless of any government 
interest in the content of the expression. If the government is 
speaking, however, the government speech doctrine applies, for 
the government is “‘entitled to say what it wishes’ in promoting 
its policies, regardless of the effect that such speech may have 
on private parties.”72 This framework creates the strict dichot-
omy between governmental and private speech. 
b. An Evolving Doctrine: Subsequent Case Law 
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Supreme Court 
confronted a similar subsidy program to that in Rust but 
reached the opposite result.73 In Velazquez, Congress subsidized 
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) organizations to provide free 
 
not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines 
of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.” (citation omitted)).  
 68. Id. at 209–11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“This type of intrusive, ideo-
logically based regulation of speech . . . cannot be justified simply because it is 
a condition upon the receipt of a governmental benefit.”). 
 69. See id. at 194, 196. 
 70. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The 
Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counsel-
ing activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental speech; 
when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust 
on this understanding.”); see also Compelled Speech, supra note 20 (explaining 
the Rust framework). 
 71. Compelled Speech, supra note 20. 
 72. Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 833 (1995)). 
 73. 531 U.S. 533, 536–37 (2001). 
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legal assistance for indigent clients seeking welfare benefits, 
but prohibited such organizations from representing clients in 
ways that attempted to amend or otherwise challenge existing 
welfare law.74 Thus, LSC-funded attorneys could not argue to a 
court that a state statute conflicted with a federal statute, or 
that either statute violated the Constitution.75 LSC attorneys 
and their indigent clients claimed the funding restriction vio-
lated the First Amendment and was intended to discourage 
challenges to the status quo.76 
The Court found that the funding condition was an uncon-
stitutional viewpoint-based restriction on private speech.77 Dis-
tinguishing the case from Rust, the Court reasoned that the 
LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech (the at-
torneys speaking on their clients’ behalf), not to promote a gov-
ernment message.78 The Court determined the restriction 
“sift[ed] out cases presenting constitutional challenges in order 
to insulate the Government’s laws from judicial inquiry.”79 Un-
sympathetic to the government’s argument that it was ensur-
ing its funds were used within the limits of the program it cre-
ated, the Court stated: “Congress cannot recast a condition on 
funding as a mere definition of its program in every case, lest 
the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exer-
cise.”80 
In Velazquez, the Court shaped the government speech 
doctrine by recognizing the differences between government-
funded programs wherein (1) the government is itself the 
speaker (a clear case of government speech, where the govern-
ment has “virtually boundless discretion to say what it wish-
es”81); (2) the government uses private speakers to transmit 
specific information about government programs (as in Rust, 
where the government speech doctrine applies); and (3) the 
government funds a program intended to facilitate private 
speech, not promote a government message (as in Velazquez, 
where the First Amendment, not the government speech doc-
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 537, 539. 
 77. Id. at 542. 
 78. Id. at 542–43. 
 79. Id. at 546. 
 80. Id. at 547. 
 81. Compelled Speech, supra note 20. 
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trine, applies).82 In practice, however, these distinctions can be 
a difficult pill to swallow with the factual similarities between 
Velazquez and Rust.83 
The final government speech ruling discussed in this Sec-
tion comes from the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum.84 The issue in the case was 
whether monuments donated by private entities in a city park 
constituted government speech, or private speech in a public 
forum.85 The park contained fifteen monuments, including a 
Ten Commandments monument that was donated by a reli-
gious organization in 1971.86 Summum, another religious or-
ganization, requested permission to donate a religious monu-
ment of its own, but the city refused.87 Summum sued the city, 
claiming Pleasant Grove violated its First Amendment rights 
by refusing to accept its monument in a traditional public fo-
rum.88 The Court was forthright in its decision that the monu-
ments were government speech: “There may be situations in 
which it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is 
speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum for private 
speech, but this case does not present such a situation.”89 The 
Court reasoned that the permanence of the monument and the 
 
 82. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541–42. The Velazquez Court relied on a num-
ber of limited public forum cases in its opinion, and it recognized the similari-
ties between the subsidy in this case and limited public forums: 
When the government creates a limited forum for speech, certain re-
strictions may be necessary to define the limits and purposes of the 
program. The same is true when the government establishes a subsi-
dy for specified ends. As this suit involves a subsidy, limited forum 
cases . . . [involving government property] may not be controlling in a 
strict sense, yet they do provide some instruction. 
Id. at 543–44 (citations omitted). This reasoning suggests that despite the 
government’s speech interests, the Court treated the LSC program as analo-
gous to a limited public forum, with the speech restriction failing because it 
was not reasonable in light of the nature of the program and/or not viewpoint 
neutral. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 83. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 84. 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 85. Id. at 467 (“The parties’ fundamental disagreement thus centers on 
the nature of petitioners’ conduct when they permitted privately donated 
monuments to be erected in Pioneer Park. Were petitioners engaging in their 
own expressive conduct? Or were they providing a forum for private speech?”). 
 86. Id. at 464–65. 
 87. Id. at 465. Pleasant Grove stated that it only accepted monuments 
that directly related to the history of the city, or were donated by organiza-
tions with long-standing ties to the Pleasant Grove community. Id. 
 88. Id. at 466. 
 89. Id. at 470. 
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limited space available meant that the public was likely to at-
tribute the monument’s message to the government.90 Thus, be-
cause the government speech doctrine allows the government to 
choose its own speech and message, it was permissible for the 
city to accept some privately donated monuments but reject 
others without violating the First Amendment.91 
Summum demonstrates the pragmatic underpinnings of 
the government speech doctrine: if the Court had reached the 
opposite result, a government who accepted privately donated 
art would have to accept a similar donation from any other pri-
vate organization.92 Using this logic, the Court noted, the Unit-
ed States would have had to either reject France’s gift of the 
Statue of Liberty in 1884, or provide a comparable location in 
the harbor of New York for similar statues from other coun-
tries.93 The Court determined it was impractical to rule that the 
statues were private speech in a public forum: if public parks 
were required to either accept all donated monuments or refuse 
them all, parks would surely be forced to refuse all donations. 
As the Court stated, “[W]here the application of forum analysis 
would lead almost inexorably to closing of the forum, it is obvi-
ous that forum analysis is out of place.”94 
Not all cases involving a clash of First Amendment doc-
trines lead to such an “obvious” conclusion. The current dichot-
omous approach to categorizing contested speech requires 
courts to disregard the interests of a speaker with a stake in 
the message, either the private party or government entity,95 
without a predictable or transparent method for balancing 
those interests.96 A court can decide contested speech belongs to 
the government without analyzing what government interests 
are at play, or why those interests outweigh those of the private 
 
 90. Id. at 470–71, 479. 
 91. Id. at 481. 
 92. Id. at 479–80. 
 93. Id. at 479. 
 94. Id. at 480. 
 95. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 608 (“Classifying mixed speech as purely 
private or purely governmental masks the competing interests at play. Once 
mixed speech is labeled government speech, the free speech interests of speak-
ers and audiences are dismissed. Likewise, once mixed speech is labeled pri-
vate, concerns about state endorsement of offensive, harmful, or religious 
speech are ignored.”). 
 96. See id. at 625–27 (discussing the current framework’s lack of clear 
Supreme Court guidance in the case of mixed speech). 
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speaker.97 Further, the current framework does not contem-
plate that both doctrines could be applied to separate speech 
occurring in the same forum.98 
The inability of the doctrines to accommodate speech 
claimed by both private and government entities is a significant 
limitation, both for traditional speech as well as government-
sponsored social media. Recent jurisprudence further high-
lights this flaw. 
B. RECENT FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: MAINTAINING 
THE EXPANSIVE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IN WALKER 
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Inc. is the most recent Supreme Court case involving govern-
ment and private entities laying expressive claim to the same 
speech.99 In Walker, the Court considered whether Texas’s spe-
cialty license plate program constitutes private or government 
speech.100 The program allows private individuals, organiza-
tions, and nonprofits to submit license plate design proposals to 
the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board.101 If the Board 
approves the design, the state produces the plate.102 In 2009, 
the Texas Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) 
proposed a specialty plate design featuring a Confederate battle 
flag, which the Board rejected.103 SCV sued, arguing the Board 
unconstitutionally discriminated based on viewpoint by refus-
ing to approve the design.104 
The majority opinion relied on Rust and Summum to de-
termine that the specialty license plates conveyed government 
speech, not private; thus, the government speech doctrine ap-
plied, and the restriction was not subject to analysis under the 
public forum doctrine.105 Similar to the Court’s analysis of the 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.; see also David S. Ardia, Government Speech and Online Forums: 
First Amendment Limitations on Moderating Public Discourse on Government 
Websites, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1981, 2028–29 (2010) (explaining that the gov-
ernment speech doctrine assumes—wrongly, in the case of online, interactive 
speech—that discourse between the government and citizens is asynchronous: 
the government speaks, and the public listens). 
 99. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
 100. Id. at 2243–44. 
 101. Id. at 2244. 
 102. Id. at 2244–45. 
 103. Id. at 2245. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 2245–50 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 
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park in Summum, the Walker Court noted a long history of 
communicating governmental messages on license plates, and 
determined that the public was likely to attribute the speech to 
the government.106 The Court surmised this was part of the 
draw for specialty plates in the first place: to give the appear-
ance of the government’s approval with the message.107 Finally, 
again comparing the case to Summum, the Court found that 
Texas “effectively controlled” the messages conveyed on its spe-
cialty plates by exercising final approval authority and reject-
ing at least a dozen proposed plates.108 Thus, the Court deter-
mined that Texas was entitled to refuse to issue plates with 
SCV’s Confederate flag design.109 
The dissent accused the majority opinion of “pass[ing] off 
private speech as government speech and, in doing so, estab-
lish[ing] a precedent that threatens private speech that gov-
ernment finds displeasing.”110 Illustrating the high stakes in 
the government-versus-private speech dichotomy, the dissent 
wrote that the Court’s decision “categorizes private speech as 
government speech and thus strips it of all First Amendment 
protection.”111 
As Walker illustrates, the Supreme Court is still grappling 
with the divide between private and government speech, but 
the government speech doctrine remains expansive. The stakes 
of the first step of the Rust framework are exceedingly high, 
since the doctrine cannot accommodate simultaneous private 
speech while the government is speaking. This doctrinal flaw is 
particularly unworkable in the context of government-
sponsored social media pages, which are intended to foster 
communication between private and governmental parties. 
Discussions on these pages occur in online spaces specifically 
designed to accommodate multiple speakers with separate 
 
460 (2009)); id. at 2246 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)). 
 106. Id. at 2248. 
 107. Id. (“Indeed, a person who displays a message on a Texas license plate 
likely intends to convey to the public that the State has endorsed that mes-
sage. If not, the individual could simply display the message in question in 
larger letters on a bumper sticker right next to the plate. But the individual 
prefers a license plate design to the purely private speech expressed through 
bumper stickers. That may well be because Texas’s license plate designs con-
vey government agreement with the message displayed.”). 
 108. Id. (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 473). 
 109. Id. at 2253. 
 110. Id. at 2254 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. at 2255. 
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speech interests, but the Supreme Court’s current framework 
for categorizing speech on public property requires courts to 
recognize either the government or the private entity as the 
speaker, often to the exclusion of the other. 
II.  THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF APPLYING CURRENT 
FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES TO SOCIAL MEDIA 
PAGES   
As Part I described, the public forum and government 
speech doctrines can be difficult to apply. The government-
versus-private speech dichotomy is especially troubling in con-
tested speech cases, as the speaker’s categorization as a gov-
ernment or private entity yields very different First Amend-
ment protections. Part II of this Note highlights and explores 
the limitations that arise when both government and private 
parties lay expressive claim to the same speech. This Part first 
analyzes the competing speech interests in government-
sponsored social media pages if such pages are deemed to con-
stitute public forums. It then follows the same analysis if gov-
ernment-sponsored social media pages constitute government 
speech. Finally, this Part discusses scholars’ calls for middle 
ground. 
A. GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED SOCIAL MEDIA PAGES UNDER A 
PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS 
As a preliminary matter, the fact that private corporations 
own social media platforms like Facebook or Twitter does not 
preclude a government-sponsored page on that platform from 
receiving public forum status.112 Although the government does 
not own the page, it is nevertheless likely to be considered pub-
lic property since the government maintains and largely con-
trols it. This is akin to the government leasing physical proper-
ty from a private owner: when the government uses a space as 
its own, that space will fall under the realm of public property 
subject to the public forum doctrine.113 
 
 112. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1996 (“[G]overnment ownership is not a sine 
qua non of public forum status . . . . The lack of government ownership or ex-
clusive control of the social media forum it establishes, however, should not 
preclude a finding of public forum status. Just as the government can rent a 
building to use as a forum for public debate and discussion, so, too, can it ‘rent’ 
a social media page for the promotion of public discussion.”). 
 113. Cf. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547 (1975) (designat-
ing a privately owned theater leased by a city government as a public forum). 
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If government-sponsored social media pages constitute 
public forums, which category of public forum applies? With the 
confusion surrounding the categories themselves, there is no 
clear answer. The traditional public forum may be ruled out, as 
the Supreme Court has made it clear that the property must be 
devoted to the public by long tradition, an impossibility for so-
cial media.114 The nonpublic forum may also be ruled out, as a 
Facebook page inviting public comments on posts is unlike an 
airport terminal, a military base, or a federal prison, where 
members of the general public are not allowed without an au-
thorized purpose.115 This leaves the middle categories: the des-
ignated public forum or the limited public forum. 
Recall that the government’s intent when creating the fo-
rum is key to distinguishing between these middle categories.116 
A court is likely to consider a government-sponsored social me-
dia page as a designated public forum if the site was intended 
to be open to commentary from all users on all topics,117 or a 
limited public forum if the site was created only for commen-
tary related to a specific purpose.118 The Court has identified 
two factors that courts may consider to determine the govern-
ment’s intent for creating a forum: the “policy and practice of 
the government” with respect to the property, and “the nature 
of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity.”119 
This Section explores these two factors. 
1. The Policy and Practice of Government-Sponsored Social 
Media Pages 
The Supreme Court has not provided much guidance on 
what the “policy and practice of the government” means, but a 
number of circuits have addressed the issue.120 The inquiry is 
meant to be factual: a court should not simply defer to the gov-
 
 114. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Lidsky, supra note 44, at 6 (“[T]he nonpublic forum . . . is charac-
terized by selective access for chosen speakers.”). 
 116. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983). 
 118. See Lidsky, supra note 44, at 5. 
 119. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
802–03 (1985). 
 120. See, e.g., Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 78 (1st Cir. 
2004); Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Dep’t of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1152–54 
(7th Cir. 1995); Ysleta Fed’n of Teachers v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 720 F.2d 
1429, 1433 (5th Cir. 1983). 
  
362 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:341 
 
ernment’s stated purpose, and “[t]he government may not ‘cre-
ate’ a policy to implement its newly-discovered [sic] desire to 
suppress a particular message.”121 Further, case law supports 
the notion that a stated or written policy in the “About” section 
of a government’s social media page is not enough to render the 
page a limited forum: “[o]bjective indicia of intent are instead 
more telling in forum analysis.”122 Thus, a written policy stating 
that “abusive” comments will be removed is not the end of the 
analysis, and it does not give the government an unfettered li-
cense to delete comments that it determines to be “abusive.”123 
Because the “policy and practice” factor is intended to be a 
factual inquiry, the outcome may depend on the comment mod-
erating policies and practices of individual government entities. 
This makes drawing broad conclusions about government-
sponsored social media pages under the public forum doctrine 
increasingly difficult. Consider two examples: On one end of the 
spectrum are sites like the White House Facebook page, which 
includes only a brief description of the page and does not in-
clude a comment policy.124 Commenters can comment on the 
government’s posts, but there is no indication that the govern-
ment responds to them.125 On the other end of the spectrum are 
sites like the University of Minnesota’s Facebook page, which 
includes a link to a website owned by the University explaining 
its comment policy.126 The link warns that inappropriate or of-
fensive posts are subject to removal, and disclaims any associa-
tion between the University and comments posted on the 
page.127 The University occasionally responds to these com-
ments.128 Based on a preliminary assessment, these government 
 
 121. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 45 F.3d at 1153 (citing Hays Cty. Guardian v. 
Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 117–18 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
 122. Id. at 1154 (citing Stewart v. D.C. Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 1019 
(D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
 123. See id. (“A stated or paper policy, without more, does not negate public 
forum status.”). 
 124. See The White House, supra note 7 (“This is the White House page on 
Facebook. Comments posted on and messages received through White House 
pages are subject to the Presidential Records Act and may be archived. Learn 
more at WhiteHouse.gov/privacy.”). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Univ. of Minn., FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/UofMN (last vis-
ited Oct. 23, 2016). 
 127. Facebook House Rules, U. OF MINN., https://www.ur.umn.edu/brand/ 
requirements-and-guidelines/social-networking/house-rules.php (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2016). 
 128. See Univ. of Minn., supra note 126. 
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entities have very different policies and practices regarding 
their pages. Assuming the University actually enforces its stat-
ed policy, the University of Minnesota’s page may be catego-
rized as a limited public forum,129 whereas the lack of a written 
comment policy indicates the White House’s page would likely 
be a designated open public forum.130 These different categori-
zations mean an identical comment on each page could receive 
different levels of First Amendment protection, despite the fact 
that that both pages are government-sponsored forums on the 
same social media platform. 
2. The Nature of Government-Sponsored Social Media Pages 
and Expressive Activities 
The second factor courts can consider to glean governmen-
tal intent for creating a forum is “the nature of the property 
and its compatibility with expressive activity.”131 This involves 
whether it was “designed for and dedicated to expressive activi-
ties” or has “the characteristics of a traditional public forum.”132 
Given the pervasiveness of social media, this is a point that re-
quires little discussion; it is difficult to imagine a space more 
designed for expressive activities. By its very definition, the na-
ture of a social media page is online expression.133 Government-
sponsored social media pages adopt this open forum atmos-
phere the same as any other page.134 It has even been suggested 
that social media has replaced the quintessential city park as 
“the new public square,” as people increasingly participate in 
discussions related to civic engagement online.135 
 
 129. See supra Part I.A.1(c). 
 130. See supra Part I.A.1(b). 
 131. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
802–03 (1985). 
 132. Id. at 803. 
 133. Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/social%20media (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (defining social media as 
“forms of electronic communication (as Web sites for social networking and 
microblogging) through which users create online communities to share infor-
mation, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos)”). 
 134. See, e.g., Governor Mark Dayton & Lieutenant Governor Tina Smith, 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/GovMarkDayton (last visited Oct. 23, 
2016) (“Governor Mark Dayton’s official Facebook page is an open forum 
where anyone with an interest in the State of Minnesota can share infor-
mation, ask advice, or express responsible, respectful opinions.”). 
 135. Bill Sherman, Your Mayor, Your “Friend”: Public Officials, Social 
Networking, and the Unmapped New Public Square, 31 PACE L. REV. 95, 95–
96 (2011). 
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After considering these two factors, the best-case scenario 
for private speakers on a government-sponsored social media 
page is the designated public forum, since this category pro-
vides essentially the same protections to private speech as a 
traditional public forum.136 Arguably, this classification is plau-
sible if both the policy and practice of the government and the 
nature of the page are conducive to expressive activities, which 
would suggest that the government intended to fully open a 
nontraditional forum to the public by creating the page.137 
Although a designated open forum status would best pro-
tect private speech interests, there are many uncertainties with 
this classification. Even relying strictly on the public forum 
doctrine, the factors identified in Cornelius could lead a court to 
determine that government-sponsored social media pages fall 
into a category with less protection for private speech—namely, 
the limited public forum.138 This categorization is troubling in 
at least two respects. First, it affords inadequate protection to 
private individuals’ speech in the context of a social media 
page. Restrictions must merely be viewpoint neutral and rea-
sonable in light of the purpose of the forum—a standard that, 
in practice, is virtually indistinguishable from that of a nonpub-
lic forum, where the government retains significant control 
over speech.139 Courts considering restrictions in limited public 
forums also tend to be heavily deferential to the government 
imposing the restriction,140 but this practice would undervalue 
private speech and run counter to the purpose of social media 
pages: open communication. 
Second, courts would still need to conduct the factual in-
quiry based on the Cornelius factors to determine the scope of 
the forum, thus opening the door for different government-
sponsored social media pages to be held to different standards 
under the First Amendment.141 This adds an additional layer of 
uncertainty to the mix for both parties: the government cannot 
be certain which standard their restrictions must satisfy (those 
 
 136. And, thus, the same protections as private speech in a non-
government setting. See supra Part I.A.1(b). 
 137. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
 138. Other authors have come to this conclusion. For more discussion on 
this point, see Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1998 (determining interactive, gov-
ernment-sponsored social media sites would most likely be considered a lim-
ited public forum). 
 139. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 141. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1998. 
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of a designated public forum or of a limited public forum), and 
commenters have no way to know how much protection their 
speech should receive until after it is removed. 
These issues aside, applying solely the public forum doc-
trine to government-sponsored social media pages under the 
current framework is, to put it mildly, unlikely. Recall that the 
preliminary question in a contested speech case involving pri-
vate expression in a government setting is who is speaking: the 
government or a private party.142 As one example, consider 
again the University of Minnesota’s Facebook page: govern-
ment actors created the page; wrote the biography and com-
menting policy; post statuses, photos, videos, and other content; 
and even interact with commenters on occasion.143 Private 
speech occurs in posts on the page’s “Timeline”144 or in desig-
nated comment sections in response to the government’s 
posts.145 Given the government’s clear presence on the page, if a 
court was forced to choose between solely private speech on one 
hand, or solely government speech (even at the risk of drown-
ing out corresponding private speech) on the other, could it 
claim the University’s Facebook page involved no government 
speech? In Walker, although private individuals submitted the 
license plate designs, the government approved, produced, and 
sold the designs.146 The government also regulated the content 
that must appear on all plates, such as the numbers, state 
name, and registration tabs, and it had a long history of doing 
so.147 Despite the presence of some private speech, the Court re-
fused to overlook the government’s undeniable connection to 
the plates and categorized the program as solely government 
speech.148 This explains the precarious situation of private 
commenters on government-sponsored social media pages un-
der the current framework, which tends to prioritize the gov-
ernment’s interest in speaking.149 
 
 142. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 143. Univ. of Minn., supra note 126. 
 144. A “Timeline” is the space on a Facebook page showing posts (such as 
statuses, videos, or photos) made by the owner of the page or by other users. 
See How Do I Post to My Timeline?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ 
help/1462219934017791 (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2239, 2244–45 (2015). 
 147. See id. at 2248–49. 
 148. Id. at 2250–51. 
 149. See Norton & Citron, supra note 56, at 916 (“[The Court] simply ap-
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3. Benefits and Risks of Classifying Government-Sponsored 
Social Media Pages as Private Speech 
There are a number of benefits to classifying government-
sponsored social media pages as solely private speech and ap-
plying the public forum doctrine. First, the main purpose of so-
cial media is to create forums for discussion, community build-
ing, and friendships.150 Government actors choose to create 
Facebook and other social media accounts for that reason—if 
encouraging discussion in a central forum was not the purpose, 
governments could opt to create static websites without com-
ment sections.151 Instead, government agencies moved to Face-
book to connect with their constituents, and protecting private 
speech is central to promoting this goal. 
Categorizing government-sponsored social media pages as 
public forums does create issues for the government, however. 
As mentioned above, the fact-based inquiry into the govern-
ment’s policy and practice with the page creates uncertainty for 
government page owners, who cannot know for certain how 
their page will be classified until a judge considers it.152 Addi-
tionally, although allowing comments does not prevent the gov-
ernment from speaking, excessive off-topic or inflammatory 
posts may dilute the government’s message, or prevent other 
citizens from having a meaningful exchange in the comments. 
The government has an interest in keeping its page free from 
vulgar, obscene, harassing, or spammy posts, just as an indi-
vidual or entity could do on their own private page.153 In allow-
ing greater restrictions on private speech, the limited public fo-
rum doctrine may address some of these governmental 
concerns; however, this categorization is unsatisfactory (even 
for government entities) due to the uncertainty it imposes for 
contested speech.154 
There is no dispute that a government entity has an inter-
est in speaking, and does speak, on its social media page.155 Any 
 
pears to defer to the government, as it has yet to deny government’s claim to 
contested speech as its own.”). 
 150. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 
1142–44 (2009) (defining social network sites). 
 151. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 1996. 
 152. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 153. Cf. Corbin, supra note 19, at 656–57 (“[T]he harm of certain messages 
is exacerbated by the government’s imprimatur.” (footnote omitted)). 
 154. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 155. See generally Norton & Citron, supra note 56 (describing the govern-
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reframing of First Amendment doctrine to remove the private-
versus-government speech dichotomy would have to adequately 
recognize the government’s legitimate interest in speaking, 
even amid private speakers. 
B. GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED SOCIAL MEDIA UNDER A 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH ANALYSIS 
As the previous Section discussed, it is unlikely that a 
court would categorize a government-sponsored social media 
page as solely private speech, considering the clear government 
presence on the page. Following this analysis, this Section ap-
plies the government speech doctrine and the Court’s holdings 
in Walker and Summum to speech on government-sponsored 
social media pages. In doing so, it discusses the significant 
harm such an analysis could pose to private speech on govern-
ment pages. This Section also addresses the impact of pragma-
tism driving First Amendment jurisprudence. 
1. Government-Sponsored Social Media Pages as Solely 
Government Speech 
When the government speaks, it is entitled to take a posi-
tion or promote a policy or program, even to the exclusion of 
other viewpoints.156 Similar to the information found on a gov-
ernment entity’s own website, a government’s social media 
posts are created by the government to convey a particular 
message.157 A government’s posts on its own social media page 
easily constitute the government speaking for itself, arguably 
even more apparently than the license plates in Walker or the 
statues in Summum.158 In Walker, the holding rested on wheth-
er or not the plates amounted to government expression; when 
 
ment speech doctrine’s relationship with government-sponsored social media 
pages). 
 156. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2239, 2246 (2015) (“How could a city government create a successful recycling 
program if officials, when writing householders asking them to recycle cans 
and bottles, had to include in the letter a long plea from the local trash dispos-
al enterprise demanding the contrary? How could a state government effec-
tively develop programs designed to encourage and provide vaccinations, if of-
ficials also had to voice the perspective of those who oppose this type of 
immunization?”). 
 157. See Norton & Citron, supra note 56, at 920–25. 
 158. Cf. id. at 920 (“In our information age, governmental use of networked 
technologies to express its views is as valuable as it is necessary. Today, the 
efficacy of government expression depends upon government’s use of net-
worked technologies . . . .”). 
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the Court determined they did, the government speech doctrine 
was the only relevant framework to apply.159 In the context of 
government-created social media posts, whether or not the gov-
ernment is speaking is not at issue. Thus, under this frame-
work, a government-sponsored social media page looks like a 
textbook case of government speech, and the government need 
not worry about violating private commenters’ free speech 
rights under the First Amendment.160 
Despite what looks like a straightforward case when 
viewed solely under the Rust framework, government-
sponsored social media pages differ from the government 
speech at issue in Walker and Summum in several important 
ways. First, a driving force of the Walker and Summum deci-
sions was the belief that the public might wrongly attribute 
messages from private parties to the government.161 The risk of 
this mistaken attribution is not an issue in social media posts, 
where the page owner’s speech is larger and more prominent 
than that of the commenters. More importantly, the speaker’s 
name and profile picture is attached to the message, so there is 
no confusion as to who is speaking.162 Further, government page 
owners can (and many do) readily attach disclaimers to their 
pages, stating that private comments do not reflect the gov-
ernment’s views.163 
In addition, unlike the park in Summum, social media 
pages are not limited in space.164 The Internet provides space to 
hold unlimited viewpoints, so the concern about the govern-
ment being forced to later accept all similar private expression 
with limited space does not apply to government-sponsored so-
cial media. In Walker, although Texas was not limited in the 
number of license plates it could produce, it was limited in the 
 
 159. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2252–53. 
 160. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
 161. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249. 
 162. Interestingly, this feature of social media resolves one frequent cri-
tique of the government speech doctrine—that because the government is not 
required to affirmatively identify itself as the source of contested speech, it is 
able to escape both First Amendment restrictions and political accountability. 
See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing). For further discussion on this critique, see generally Norton & Citron, 
supra note 56. 
 163. See, e.g., Facebook House Rules, supra note 127 (“Comments posted to 
Facebook pages do not represent the opinions of the University of Minneso-
ta.”). 
 164. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 478–80 (2009). 
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amount of space on each plate—making a viewpoint disclaimer 
on a license plate much less feasible than on a social media 
page.165 Further distinguishing Walker, the government does 
not generally play a role in accepting or approving private posts 
before they are displayed on the page. Requiring an affirmative 
action from the government in respect to private speech, such 
as approving and producing a license plate, is arguably differ-
ent from passively allowing it to remain in the comments sec-
tion.166 
2. Benefits and Risks of Government-Sponsored Social Media 
as Government Speech 
There are potential benefits, even for private individuals, 
to classifying government-sponsored social media as govern-
ment speech. First, government use of social media to com-
municate with constituents is beneficial for society.167 Improved 
access to information and communication with elected officials 
helps build an informed electorate, ensures political accounta-
bility, and ultimately supports the democratic process.168 Gov-
ernments are arguably more likely to use social media pages 
when they have some protection against violating private 
speech rights under the First Amendment.169 This access to in-
formation is valuable to citizens, and perhaps it is worth allow-
 
 165. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249–51. 
 166. Id. at 2251. Some social media sites, such as Facebook, have an op-
tional feature that allows page administrators to block comments that contain 
certain words, such as profanity, before they are posted on the page; however, 
administrators cannot approve every individual post or comment. See Modera-
tion, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/329858980428740 (select 
“How Can I Proactively Moderate Content Published on My Page?”) (last visit-
ed Oct. 23, 2016). Although not relevant under a government speech doctrine 
analysis, this practice raises additional questions regarding prior restraint 
under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 
U.S. 546, 558–59 (1975) (discussing the constitutionality of prior restraints 
against traditional speech); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 
(1963) (same). 
 167. See Norton & Citron, supra note 56, at 939 (“[G]overnment expression 
is valuable primarily because it gives the public more information with which 
to assess their government.”). 
 168. Id. at 920. 
 169. See Ross Rinehart, “Friending” and “Following” the Government: How 
the Public Forum and Government Speech Doctrines Discourage the Govern-
ment’s Social Media Presence, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 781, 781 (2013) (dis-
cussing the decision of the local government in Redondo Beach, Cal., to aban-
don its social media presence due to uncertainty of how to manage its social 
media page without violating commenters’ First Amendment rights). 
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ing government entities greater editorial control over their 
pages in order to achieve it.170 
Another important characteristic of a government-
sponsored social media page is that because the government 
does not own Facebook, it does not have control over the entire 
platform. In Rust, the Court determined the Title X restrictions 
against providing information about abortion were permissible 
government speech, in part because the patients could receive 
that information outside of the scope of the program.171 Face-
book pages are similar to this: users who wish to express them-
selves in a way that conflicts with the focus of a government 
entity’s page are free to simply create their own. Although the 
user could not take advantage of the government’s audience, 
Facebook is a free service that provides equal access to a plat-
form for expression.172 
These benefits notwithstanding, categorizing government-
sponsored social media as solely government speech would pose 
significant risks to the free speech interests of private users. 
First, the government’s selective comment editing could distort 
the marketplace of ideas to artificially portray a position as 
more popular than it is.173 There is no real check on the gov-
ernment’s editing: even if a user notices his or her comment has 
been removed, there is very little he or she could do about it. 
Thus, the public’s primary recourse for government speech it 
disagrees with—political accountability—is significantly un-
dermined.174 Further, the option for users to create their own 
pages does not reduce their interest in speaking on the gov-
ernment’s page: the Supreme Court has held that the mere fact 
that a person could speak in some other place does not justify 
 
 170. See generally id. 
 171. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (“Under the Secretary’s 
regulations, however, a doctor’s ability to provide, and a woman’s right to re-
ceive, information concerning abortion and abortion-related services outside 
the context of the Title X project remains unfettered.”); see also Legal Servs. 
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546–47 (2001) (distinguishing Rust because 
unlike LSC’s indigent clients, a patient in Rust had alternative channels from 
which to receive abortion counseling). 
 172. See Create an Account, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/ 
345121355559712?helpref=page_content (select “Does It Cost Money to Use 
Facebook?”) (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). 
 173. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 668–69 (“[A] position perceived as popu-
lar is likely to wield greater influence.”). 
 174. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 663–64 (stating the public’s remedy of 
democratic accountability under the government speech doctrine “is only effec-
tive so long as reasonable citizens know when the government speaks”). 
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exclusion from an appropriate forum.175 As a practical matter, 
the option for a separate forum is of very little use when the 
message a private individual is trying to convey requires access 
to the government’s audience in order to be effective—such as 
when a commenter is responding to something the government 
posted on its page. 
3. Pragmatism as a Driving Force of Contested Speech 
Determinations 
The current government-versus-private speech dichotomy 
allows courts to resolve cases in ways that address pragmatic 
concerns, rather than reaching transparent and predictable ju-
dicial rulings. The divergent outcomes in Rust and Velazquez 
are one example of this pragmatic underpinning. The Court 
reasoned in Velazquez that the subsidized speech was not gov-
ernment speech because subsidized attorneys have a profes-
sional obligation to represent the interests of their clients.176 
The doctors in Rust also had a professional obligation to serve 
the interests of their patients; however, the majority there 
found that the doctors’ advice to their patients did constitute 
government speech.177 These cases introduce a familiar thread 
running through government speech cases, and First Amend-
ment doctrines as a whole: pragmatism.178 Perhaps the Court 
found prohibiting all discussion of abortion between a patient 
and her doctor palatable under the circumstances, but could 
not tolerate leaving indigent LSC clients incapable of challeng-
ing welfare laws. In this way, the government speech doctrine 
can sometimes function as a safety net for the most objectiona-
ble cases—such as forcing the government to produce Confed-
erate flag license plates.179 But the contrary outcomes in Rust 
 
 175. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (“[O]ne is not to have the 
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea 
that it may be exercised in some other place.”). 
 176. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542. 
 177. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If the private doctors’ confidential 
advice to their patients at issue in Rust constituted ‘government speech,’ it is 
hard to imagine what subsidized speech would not be government speech.”). 
 178. Norton & Citron, supra note 56, at 915 (“To be sure, pragmatism often 
drives the Court’s First Amendment doctrine.”); Richard A. Posner, Pragma-
tism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 
739 (2002) (“[T]he constitutional law of free speech seems on the whole, 
though certainly not in every respect, to be a product of the judges’ (mainly 
they are United States Supreme Court Justices) trying to reach results that 
are reasonable in light of their consequences.”). 
 179. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 656–59. 
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and Velazquez illustrate the lack of predictability such a system 
creates, where speech’s potential harmful consequences are 
weighed against its expressive value.180 A structured, transpar-
ent method of balancing competing expressive interests could 
help avoid the piecemeal, outcome-driven, and unpredictable 
results of the government-versus-private speech dichotomy. 
C. THE CALL FOR MIDDLE GROUND IN THE PRIVATE-
GOVERNMENT SPEECH DICHOTOMY 
This Note is not the first to call for middle ground between 
the strict private-versus-government speech dichotomy.181 Forc-
ing onward with a framework too inflexible to recognize con-
tested speech with joint expressive claims undermines both 
private and government speech interests, and encourages 
courts to rule based on a pragmatic view of what the “right” 
outcome should be.182 This provides no transparent process to 
balance the competing interests and instead requires courts to 
completely disregard the other, legitimate claim to expres-
sion.183 
One scholar wrote at length about a potential middle cate-
gory, in which deadlocked “mixed speech” cases with private 
and governmental parties holding equally weighty interests 
would be subjected to intermediate scrutiny.184 To satisfy this 
standard, restrictions on private expression resulting in view-
point-based discrimination would be allowed only if the gov-
ernment held an important constitutional interest known to the 
public and the restriction on private speech was not broader 
than necessary; the government had no alternate means to pro-
tect its interest; and private speakers had alternative channels 
to express their message.185 Although this Note agrees that a 
middle category is necessary, it posits that past authors’ calls 
for a softening of the dichotomy have not been nuanced enough 
 
 180. For an article in support of conducting a cost-benefit analysis under 
the First Amendment, see generally Posner, supra note 178. Cf. Jed 
Rubenfeld, A Reply to Posner, 54 STAN. L. REV. 753, 753 (2002) (“[C]ost-benefit 
‘reasoning’ in free speech law is unnecessary and unacceptable . . . . It turns 
judges into legislators, evaluating pure policy matters under the guise of con-
stitutional review. Worse, it betrays fundamental First Amendment commit-
ments.”). 
 181. Corbin, supra note 19; see also Lidsky, supra note 23. 
 182. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 183. Corbin, supra note 19, at 608. 
 184. Id. at 675–80. 
 185. Id. at 675. 
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to capture the intricate differences between traditional and 
online speech, and have overlooked a preliminary first step that 
would better serve both private parties and the government: 
Can the audience clearly distinguish between the speakers? The 
next Part argues for a new framework that integrates this 
question. 
III.  A SOLUTION TO MAXIMIZE SPEECH PROTECTION: 
TREATING SEPARABLE CONTESTED SPEECH IN 
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED SOCIAL MEDIA   
The current one-doctrine-fits-all approach is ill-suited for 
any speech to which both private and governmental parties lay 
expressive claim, but is particularly troublesome with govern-
ment-sponsored social media, where the design and function of 
popular websites allows the government and its audience to 
clearly distinguish between government and private speech. 
This Note introduces a framework with which to consider con-
tested speech in these cases. This Part first describes the new 
concepts of separable and combined speech. It then explains 
how these concepts can be integrated as a preliminary step to 
the government-versus-private speech analysis to better protect 
both private and government interests. The final Section ad-
dresses potential counterarguments. 
A. IDENTIFYING SEPARABLE AND COMBINED SPEECH 
This Note argues that there are two kinds of speech to 
which both private and governmental parties lay expressive 
claim: speech originating from a single speaker but involving 
multiple parties’ interests in expression (combined speech),186 
and speech occurring in the same space with more than one 
identifiable speaker (separable speech).187 Traditional forms of 
speech with competing expressive claims largely involve com-
bined speech, where audiences cannot easily separate private 
 
 186. See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 
(2009); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553–554 (2005). The 
Supreme Court viewed the contested speech at issue in these cases as originat-
ing from a single speaker, even if multiple parties had expressive interests or 
played a role in the donation, design, or selection of the speech. 
 187. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). This 
Note will use “separable speech” to refer to contested speech cases where audi-
ences can distinguish between speakers, and “combined speech” where audi-
ences cannot draw such distinctions. 
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speech from that of the government.188 Consider specialty li-
cense plates as an example: although a person seeing a “Choose 
Life” plate will likely associate the plate with both the govern-
ment who created it and the driver who chose to attach it to her 
car, the plate itself does not distinguish between the competing 
interests.189 Other scholars, focusing on traditional and com-
bined forms of speech such as license plates, have thus pro-
posed solutions that deal with the private and government 
speech interests in the same way.190 These proposals are overly 
broad with regard to separable speech. 
Government-sponsored social media pages are a unique 
example of separable speech, where the design and functionali-
ty of the website draws a distinct line between speech originat-
ing from the government actor and comments from private 
speakers.191 The posts from the administrator of a Facebook 
page (the government entity, in the case of government-
sponsored social media pages) are displayed larger and more 
prominently on the entity’s Timeline than are private posts or 
comments.192 Users typically must click a link to see more than 
two comments—users who are not willing to risk seeing offen-
sive or harmful comments may choose to keep scrolling.193 Most 
importantly, the name and profile picture of the user is at-
tached to each post, making it inescapably clear in most cases 
whether the government or a private party is speaking.194 Fi-
nally, governments can (and, indeed, many do) include a dis-
claimer notice in the “About” section of their Timeline, notify-
ing users that views expressed in the comments do not reflect 
the views of the government entity maintaining the page.195 
 
 188. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248–50. Unlike on a social media page, on a 
license plate with limited space the government could not easily distinguish 
itself from the private speech with a disclaimer notice; indeed, the disclaimer 
itself could substantially interfere with the speech. 
 190. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 675–76. 
 191. For a demonstration of these features, see, for example, The White 
House, supra note 7. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1970) (“[People offended by 
speech may] effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simp-
ly by averting their eyes.”). 
 194. Id. 
 195. See, e.g., The United States Department of Justice, FACEBOOK, https:// 
www.facebook.com/DOJ/about/?entity_point=page_nav_about_item&tab=page
_info (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (“The Department of Justice is pleased to par-
ticipate in open, un-moderated forums offered by commercial social networks 
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This option is much less feasible in many combined, traditional 
speech instances. This Note argues that under these circum-
stances, there is no reason to treat separable and combined 
speech alike, as other authors supporting the creation of a mid-
dle category seem to suggest. 
B. TAILORING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS TO SEPARABLE 
SPEECH 
Before applying the blanket intermediate scrutiny other 
scholars have suggested,196 this Note contends that courts 
should first determine whether the private and governmental 
aspects of the speech can be separated and addressed accord-
ingly. When speech is separable, such as in the case of govern-
ment-sponsored social media pages, courts should apply the 
government speech doctrine to the government’s own posts, but 
uphold stronger protections for private speech by categorizing 
the comments section as a designated public forum. This solu-
tion adequately protects the government’s ability to speak for 
itself while preserving the free-flowing marketplace of ideas 
with a transparent judicial test. 
This separate treatment method would prioritize the pro-
tection of private speech over the government’s by restricting 
the government’s ability to delete posts it did not create; how-
ever, in the case of separable speech on a government-
sponsored social media page, this “imbalance” is in society’s 
best interest. This Note contends that fears about a lack of gov-
ernment editorial control of social media pages are overblown. 
Although the government does have an interest in maintaining 
an orderly page free from harassing or vulgar posts,197 the fea-
tures of social media naturally address these government con-
cerns. Users can hide messages they do not want to see from 
their Timelines, or take the extra step to report an abusive post 
 
sites in order to increase government transparency, promote public participa-
tion and encourage collaboration with the department. Please note that the 
department does not control, moderate or endorse the comments or opinions 
provided by visitors to this site.”). Critics may counter that it would unfairly 
burden the government to require or expect them to alter their own speech by 
posting a disclaimer. However, this disclaimer is merely an option for govern-
ment entities who are concerned about mistaken attribution—it is not a re-
quirement, but a way for the government to ensure it can speak for itself. The 
same is true for a written comment policy. 
 196. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 675–80. 
 197. See Norton & Citron, supra note 56, at 920 (explaining the importance 
of governmental use of social media to convey government opinions). 
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to Facebook. Facebook’s “Community Standards” apply to both 
private and governmental pages.198 Crucially, this feature pro-
vides an extra layer of protection: because the government does 
not own the entire platform, there is a non-governmental third 
party providing baseline protection against abusive, obscene, or 
spammy posts.199 Arguably, with this extra protection, the gov-
ernment has even less of an interest in editing private speech 
on its page: if a post does not violate Facebook’s Community 
Standards, which are not constrained by the First Amendment, 
it should not be restricted under the government’s standards. 
Further, when it comes to deleting demeaning, derogatory, 
or harassing posts, the line between a subject-matter re-
striction and viewpoint discrimination is difficult to distin-
guish.200 Even if a government entity was to adopt an across-
the-board ban on profanity, for example, the claim that this ban 
is viewpoint neutral incorrectly assumes that all viewpoints 
can be expressed effectively without swearing.201 Even a seem-
ingly neutral subject matter-ban can be used to suppress un-
popular views, and determining what is offensive, demeaning, 
or derogatory is inherently subjective. This distinction should 
not be left to government officials. 
 
 198. Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ 
communitystandards (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). As one example, Facebook’s 
Community Standards prohibit direct threats: “We carefully review reports of 
threatening language to identify serious threats of harm to public and person-
al safety. We remove credible threats of physical harm to individuals. We also 
remove specific threats of theft, vandalism, or other financial harm.” 
 199. Id. 
 200. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 830–31 (1995) (“[D]iscrimination against one set of views or ideas is but a 
subset or particular instance of the more general phenomenon of content dis-
crimination. And, it must be acknowledged, the distinction is not a precise 
one.” (citation omitted)); Corbin, supra note 19, at 651 (“[T]he line between 
subject-matter discrimination and viewpoint discrimination is slippery and not 
always apparent.”). 
 201. Corbin, supra note 19, at 650–53. As one illustrative example, consid-
er the case Cohen v. California, in which the Supreme Court overturned a 
man’s conviction for disturbing the peace. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Cohen was crim-
inally charged for wearing a jacket with the phrase “Fuck the Draft” inside of 
a courthouse. Id. at 16. Could Cohen have conveyed the same message as ef-
fectively with another phrase? “No to the Draft”? What about “I Dislike the 
Draft”? Not according to the majority opinion: “[W]e cannot indulge the facile 
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a sub-
stantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might 
soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for 
banning the expression of unpopular views.” Id. at 26.  
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Finally, consider again the example of the Minneapolis Po-
lice Department’s Facebook page. If government-sponsored so-
cial media pages were analyzed solely under the government 
speech doctrine, as the Rust framework requires, the govern-
ment would be free to delete comments to stifle the important 
debate happening on the Department’s page in response to re-
cent police shootings of unarmed civilians. Even if the govern-
ment tried to moderate posts in a viewpoint-neutral way, the 
manner in which these views are presented—offensive, crude, 
or otherwise—may be equally as important as the views them-
selves.202 The language a commenter uses reveals a great deal 
about the speaker, and adds an additional layer to the debate. 
Removing this layer would leave citizens with a skewed view of 
the issues. The comments on the Minneapolis Police Depart-
ment’s Facebook page spurred debate not only about police 
conduct, but about the comments themselves: the posts provide 
a glimpse at the divisive and polarizing reactions from the pub-
lic.203 These reactions serve an important purpose in the mar-
ketplace of ideas.204 The government does have an interest in 
maintaining order on its page, but this interest is adequately 
served through the page administrator’s ability to control its 
own posts on the page; meanwhile, society’s interest in a robust 
marketplace of ideas would be greatly undermined if the com-
ments section of the page were deemed government speech. 
It should be up to society to determine what discourse it 
will accept; it should not be the government’s job to protect its 
 
 202. As the Court explained in Cohen: 
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it 
conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explica-
tion, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are 
often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We 
cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the 
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that 
emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more 
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated. 
Id. 
 203. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text. 
 204. Other authors have identified that listeners, not just speakers, have a 
First Amendment interest in speech. Applying this approach to posts on gov-
ernment-sponsored social media, not only would the commenter have an inter-
est in speaking, but other individuals viewing the post could have an interest 
in accurately receiving the speech, unfiltered by the government. For a discus-
sion of this listener-based approach in the context of employer speech, see 
generally Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech 
and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31 (2016). 
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people from hurtful, rude, and racist views.205 It is this Note’s 
position that the viler the speech, the more important it is that 
society not be shielded from it—the best cure for bad speech is 
more speech.206 The government can clarify its own position in 
other, more effective channels that do not involve infringing on 
private speech rights, such as posting a status, including a dis-
claimer in the page description, or doing outreach on- or offline 
to try to educate the people who hold these harmful or distaste-
ful beliefs. The government can also choose to turn off com-
menting features on many of its websites. These forms of ex-
pression are all clearly within the governments’ speech rights; 
removing troubling comments to attempt to sweep the issue 
under the rug should not be. 
C. A FEW THOUGHTS ON POSSIBLE COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Critics may wonder: If the corporate owner of a social me-
dia platform can remove abusive comments, what is the practi-
cal difference if it is instead the government that clicks “delete” 
on the same comment? It may be argued that relying on Face-
book to regulate the government’s page only serves to outsource 
the same censorship—the user’s speech interests face identical 
harm. Viewed from an “ends justify the means” perspective, 
this argument has some facial appeal. But under the First 
Amendment, it is the means that matter. Consider prior re-
straints, which are heavily presumed to be unconstitutional ex-
cept in extremely limited circumstances: rather than prevent 
speech from occurring, the government must wait until after 
the expression has taken place to take legal action.207 Even if 
the end is the same, the First Amendment restricts the means 
the government can take to get to that end. 
Only the government is constrained by the First Amend-
ment, not the private corporation who owns the platform—and 
 
 205. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25 (“Surely the State has no right to cleanse public 
debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish 
among us. . . . [O]ne man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”). 
 206. See Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1926) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fal-
lacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied 
is more speech, not enforced silence.”). 
 207. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (declaring 
that “any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing 
a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”); Near v. Minnesota, 
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (finding the statute in question to be an unconstitutional 
prior restraint and an infringement on the freedom of the press). 
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this distinction is crucial. Facebook’s standards of removal are 
part of the terms and conditions to which every person who 
creates a Facebook account agrees.208 Even if a user’s comment 
on a government page does violate Facebook’s Community 
Standards, the user entered into the agreement with Face-
book—not the government. Thus, the risk of removal by Face-
book on a government page is no different than on any other 
page on the platform. Additionally, social media companies 
such as Facebook and Twitter do not simply remove comments 
on their own accord; the post must be reported to Facebook by a 
third party, and verified to violate a Community Standard. 
This is an arguably more objective process than a government 
removing speech it considers “abusive” from its own page, espe-
cially if that speech happens to be critical of the government. 
Next, consider a few hypotheticals. This Note contends 
that government entities on social media must take the bitter 
with the sweet; that is, when the government creates a page to 
connect with constituents, it opens itself up to all public ex-
pression, not just those comments it wishes to portray. But 
what if the government was not intending to connect with con-
stituents at all, but simply to convey information? One might 
imagine a scenario where the government joined Facebook to 
broadcast its message to users who were already on the plat-
form, but did not wish to open up a dialogue in the comments 
section. As such, the argument might go, the page should be 
considered entirely government speech since the government 
only intended to convey messages, not to solicit comments from 
users. 
This theory presents a particularly unworkable regime of 
government censorship of online speech. Here, the amount of 
protection provided to comments would depend not only on the 
government’s subjective intention for the expression it intended 
to create, but also the expression it intended to receive—the 
platform’s commenting functionalities notwithstanding. It is 
difficult to see how a court could determine this intent short of 
simply taking the government at its word in every case. The 
feasibility of this standard aside, such an analysis would force 
courts to perform a factual inquiry in each case of contested 
speech on a government page, leading to the same problems 
with predictability that governments and commenters current-
ly face. 
 
 208. See Community Standards, supra note 198. 
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To resolve this issue, this Note instead proposes a bright 
line rule: when a government claims part of a pre-existing 
space as its own, such as a page on a social media platform, 
courts should look to the expressive nature of the space as a 
whole, not to the government’s intention for an individual page. 
This standard would promote greater predictability, less sub-
jectivity, and would remove the need for an individualized fac-
tual inquiry after a forum has been initially established. If a 
government chose to commandeer a space for itself on a forum 
that is intended to promote expressive activities, such as a so-
cial media platform, the resulting government page should also 
be considered to promote expressive activity regardless of the 
government’s subjective intention. 
A more complex issue arises if a government did own the 
social media forum and created its own page. In this case, there 
is no third party to provide baseline comment moderation. This 
Note maintains that the government should be at the mercy of 
the page it created; that is, if the government created an open 
comment section on its page, it clearly solicits private speech 
and should be considered a designated open forum. Does this 
change if the government implemented a written comment pol-
icy similar to Facebook and Twitter? In this scenario, the gov-
ernment may have a stronger interest in preventing the com-
ments on its page from becoming a “cesspool” of potential 
threats, fighting words, or defamation. However, this Note con-
tends that the recourse in these cases is not government cen-
sorship; rather, the injured party may take appropriate legal 
action against the speaker. The Supreme Court has recognized 
that these kinds of speech are not protected under the First 
Amendment, and the fact that the speech occurs in a public fo-
rum does not change this. 
This remedy is better suited to protect private speech 
rights. When a government creates a comment policy that al-
lows it to delete “abusive” speech, there is no reliable way to 
moderate whether or not it abides by the policy. Faced with 
displeasing speech and likely no consequences for removal, the 
government would have a perverse incentive to discriminate 
against speech on its page based on viewpoint. But even if a 
government was dedicated to following its policy by the book, 
private speakers are left in a precarious situation. What sepa-
rates “abusive” speech from online protest speech on an issue of 
public concern? Thus, the problems of accountability and pre-
dictability remain. 
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Finally, a government entity may argue that by nature of 
existing, some comments interfere with the government’s abil-
ity to shape its own message how it wants. Thus, restricting the 
government’s ability to remove such a post detracts from the 
extensive rights afforded to the main post under the govern-
ment speech doctrine. This argument has some merit; however, 
this is a risk the government takes by expanding to a forum 
with open commenting capabilities. For the separable speech 
framework to have any meaning, the government speech doc-
trine cannot be permitted to seep into the public forum com-
ment section. If a government entity is truly concerned that a 
comment is affecting its message, it may spread its message 
uninterrupted using a static webpage instead of or in addition 
to the interactive public forum. Further, if the audience could 
not separate between the speakers, then under this Note’s pro-
posed framework the speech would receive intermediate scruti-
ny under the private-versus-government speech continuum. 
  CONCLUSION   
As the interactions between government entities and pri-
vate parties continue to move online, the application of the pub-
lic forum and government speech doctrines to speech in the dig-
ital sphere will become increasingly problematic. The flawed 
government-versus-private speech dichotomy leaves no room 
for multiple speakers to receive separate speech classifications, 
even though the design and function of social media sites 
makes distinguishing between government and private speak-
ers easier than ever. 
Although other commenters have called for replacing the 
strict dichotomy with a separate category for contested speech, 
this Note proposes that courts should first determine whether 
the private and government speech within the forum are suffi-
ciently distinct to receive separate First Amendment protec-
tions. If so, courts should treat each category separately—such 
as in the case of government-sponsored social media pages, 
where the audience can clearly distinguish between a govern-
ment page owner’s post and a private individual’s comment in 
response. The government page owner’s post should receive the 
protections afforded under the government speech doctrine, 
whereas the comment section should be considered a designat-
ed public forum. This new framework affords adequate protec-
tion to private speech while respecting the government’s inter-
est in speaking for itself. This is a valuable addition to existing 
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scholarship, which calls for a middle category to balance gov-
ernmental and private speech. The public’s ability to distin-
guish between speakers in cases of separable speech, as well as 
the policy reasons to uphold the marketplace of ideas even for 
offensive viewpoints, necessitates removing the harmful gov-
ernment-versus-private speech dichotomy and adding the sepa-
rable speech test before balancing conflicting speech interests 
in the proposed middle category. 
